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From Government to Governance: 
External Influences on Business Risk Management 
Professor Bridget M. Hutter and Mr. Clive J. Jones1 
Abstract 
The influence of external organizations and pressures on business 
risk management practices has hitherto been examined through the 
influence of state regulatory regimes on businesses. This literature 
concentrates on key socio-legal concerns about the influence of the 
law in social and economic life. We know that the sources of 
regulation and risk management are diversifying beyond the state. 
What we do not have is much empirically informed research about 
the range of sources influencing the business world and in particular 
the weighting of influence exercised by them. In this paper we will 
explore the understandings regulatory actors have of the different 
external pressures upon business risk management through an 
empirical study of the understandings of those in the food retail 
sector about the management of food safety and food hygiene risks. 
A broader objective is to throw some further light onto the debate 
about regulation within and beyond the state. 
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2 
Introduction 
 
One aim of many modern regulatory regimes is to influence the risk 
management practices of organizations.  The objective is to get 
organizations to prioritise risk management practices high relative to 
other organizational objectives. Regulation2 is part of a structuring 
process which helps constitute order in economic life (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992).  It aims to shape motives and preferences and 
penetrate business organizations’ objectives and practices (Shearing, 
1993).   
 
Research has focused on the way in which state regulatory regimes 
impact on business organizations.  The literature identifies a number 
of factors which influence the impact of regulatory law on businesses 
and indicates that state influence through law is a necessary but not 
sufficient influence upon business risk management (Gunningham 
and Kagan 2005; Hutter 2001). There is increasing acknowledgement 
that regulatory space is occupied by the state and a variety of non-
state players, and that there is a move to outsource public 
management functions (Hancher and Moran 1989; Hutter, 2006; 
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Scott 2001). This is central to 
discussions of the move from government to governance.  
 
Concerns about the limits of state activities led in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s to debates about a crisis in state regulation. This 
prompted policy discussions which advocated a regulatory mix in 
which the state harnesses sources of regulation beyond the state 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998).  
This was also seen as a means of empowering different participants 
in the regulatory process in order to maximize the promotion and 
achievement of risk management. A series of studies have 
highlighted the importance of focusing on the interplay of economic, 
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political and social forces in understanding corporate regulatory 
factors. Also relevant is their interaction with the internal 
organization of a business and the views and behaviours of its 
management and employees.3  
 
This paper addresses a neglected issue in all of these discussions in 
its consideration of how well these academic discussions resonate 
with the regulatory knowledge of those subject to regulation.  Do 
they recognize regulation beyond the state? If so, which external 
influences are in play?  How important are they in relation to state 
regulatory influences?  And what is the nature of their influence? 
 
The research we draw on focuses on the ways in which businesses in 
the food sector in the UK understand and manage food safety and 
food hygiene risks. Data were collected in two phases from 
businesses in south-east England and Scotland. The first phase 
involved consultations with 49 experts related to the food industry.4 
Discussions, which lasted on average an hour,  were broad-ranging 
and offered a variety of perspectives on the state of food safety and 
food hygiene in the retail and catering sectors in the UK. The second 
phase comprised a questionnaire survey which was structured 
according to business type; notably the food retail and catering 
sectors and the size of business.5 A total of 204 individuals across 31 
businesses responded to the survey6. 
 
External influences on business risk management: economic 
and civil 
 
Analytically we can identify two sources of regulation which are 
autonomous and independent from the state, namely the economic 
sector and civil society (Hutter, 2006). The economic sphere includes 
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a broad range of profit motivated organizations and activities 
embracing, for example, finance and industry. These include industry 
or trade organizations and companies themselves. There are also 
important hybrid forms of self-regulation, for example, enforced self-
regulation which involves a mix of state and corporate regulatory 
efforts (Braithwaite 1982; Coglianese and Lazer, 2003). Some 
market participants sell risk management products and risk 
management advice, for example, insurance companies and 
consultancies. Others may exercise influence through their 
investment or consumer choices.  
 
The term civil society embraces a fairly broad range of actors and 
organizations. Accordingly the range of sources of regulation in the 
civil sector is diverse. Perhaps the best-known regulatory sources in 
this sector are NGOs, a category which itself includes a diverse range 
of organizations which may operate at the local, national or 
international levels (Hutter and O’Mahony, 2004). Also important in 
the civil sector are standards organizations which produce standards 
about product quality, quality assurance, and risk management 
(Brunsson & Jacobsson 2000) and professional organizations which 
have long played a very important regulatory role in regulating entry 
conditions to the professions and laying down standards of conduct. 
  
These organizations may influence regulation and business risk 
management in a variety of ways. The distinction drawn by Hood et 
al (2001) between the context and content of regulation is helpful 
here. The context of regulation refers to ‘the backdrop of regulation’ 
and the content to ‘regulatory objectives, the way regulatory 
responsibilities are organized, and operating styles’ (2001: 28). In 
the case of businesses one might use similar distinctions to identify 
those having a background and indirect influence from those who 
have a much more direct influence on business risk management 
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practices. NGOs, for example, may be both part of the context and 
content of regulation; they may exert normative background 
pressure or in some cases they may be formally incorporated in 
business risk management and corporate social responsibility 
initiatives. 
 
Let us now turn our attention to how these issues work out in 
practice in one particular area of risk management, namely that of 
food safety and food hygiene.  
 
Management of food safety and food hygiene risks 
 
This management is designed to minimise the risk of food borne 
illnesses and we should be in no doubt that the risks here are 
considerable.  In 2000 over 5 million people in the UK and 76 million 
in the US suffered food poisoning (Adak et al, 2002).  A proportion of 
these were admitted to hospital and a small number died.  It is 
thought that the trends in food borne disease and death are 
improving and undoubtedly risk management within the food 
industry is crucial to this (Adak et al, 2002).  
  
In this section of the paper we present data from the research with 
respect to the regulated’s knowledge of external influences upon food 
safety and food hygiene practices in the  food retail sector in the UK.  
Throughout this section we will highlight any significant variations 
between respondents, we are in no way suggesting in this paper that 
there are homogenous views in this sector, far from it, the variations 
are important. 
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State regulators 
State regulatory arrangements for food retailers and catering outlets 
in the UK are organized on a national and local basis. In very general 
terms central government sets food safety policy through the Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) and local government implements this policy 
through their individual Environmental Health Departments. The 
officers of these departments monitor compliance with the minimum 
standards required by government legislation, promoting guidance 
and best practice on higher standards. Enforcement action may be 
taken against businesses which are non-compliant with minimum 
legal requirements.  
 
Food safety is often the responsibility of local government 
Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) and food standards the 
responsibility of local government Trading Standards Officers (TSOs). 
The exception to this arrangement is in London and Scotland where 
both food safety and food standards are the remit of EHOs and they 
may have the title of Food Safety Officer. EHOs do not only inspect 
food production, catering and retail premises on matters of food 
safety they perform additional duties such as housing standards, 
pollution control, health safety and welfare and noise control 
(Hampton 2005).  
 
The FSA is a policy making body with responsibility for guidelines, 
standards and codes of practice. It does have an enforcement arm, 
the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) whose activities are independent of 
and parallel to those of EHOs and as such are outside the boundaries 
of this research. Each of the home nations of the UK, except England, 
has a devolved branch of the FSA. The FSA inspects and audits the 
environmental health departments of local authorities.   
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The FSA was borne out of a crisis in food regulation in 1980s and 
1990s.  A series of food controversies, including BSE, e-coli and 
salmonella, shook confidence in the system of food regulation in 
Britain.  A number of problems were held responsible, among them 
fragmented and conflicting responsibilities for food safety in Britain.  
This led the government to follow the recommendations of the James 
Report (1997) and establish a non-ministerial department to 
undertake responsibilities previously held by multiple government 
departments and to oversee local authority enforcement. A key 
objective was to restore consumer confidence in the safety of food.  
During the course of this research there was no evidence that the 
crises of the 1980s and 1990s were material to the thinking of our 
experts or the managers we surveyed: none referred to these crises.  
While there were differences in opinion concerning the state of food 
safety and food hygiene in Britain today no one indicated that they 
considered it in a state of crisis. 
 
Those we met in the first phase of the research differed widely in 
their views about how much would be known about the state-based 
regulatory systems set up in the late 1990s. Some considered state 
regulatory arrangements to remain confusing and they expected that 
we would encounter a great deal of uncertainty in business especially 
amongst micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
particularly about the role of the FSA.7   It is notable that it was only 
in the first phase that any particular note was made of the influence 
of the European Union.  Possibly the EU did not feature in the second 
phase as EU legislation tends to be incorporated into national 
legislative regimes.  
 
In the second phase of the research managers of food businesses 
were asked about a range of matters, for example, their 
understandings of food safety and food hygiene risks, their sources of 
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information about these risks, business controls to manage risks and, 
the subject of this paper, external influences on their risk 
management sources. These included a very general question about 
the extent to which their consideration of food safety and food 
hygiene risks is influenced by sources external to the business. Table 
1 details the aggregate responses we received. In the rest of the 
paper we will consider these alongside the other interview and survey 
data we collected. 
 
The survey found that state regulatory agencies were, alongside 
consumers, the most important external influence on food businesses 
and of these, EHOs were held to have the most influence (see Table 
1). The strength of the influence is revealed in the constancy of the 
findings across different groups:  68% of managers and 67% of 
micro and small business managers claim EHOs are a strong 
influence when they are considering food safety and food hygiene 
risks with only 2% of managers and no micro or small business 
managers claiming EHOs are of no influence. 
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
Respondents were able to give detailed answers about EHOs. The 
point of contact in each business varied.  In many businesses 
managers were not present during an EHO visit and in large 
organizations the visit was often ‘handled’ by a specialist from head 
office or a more senior manager. This is not the case with micro and 
small businesses where the manager has direct and personal contact 
with the EHO. This may in part explain the additional finding that 
micro and small businesses tended to claim better quality 
relationships with EHOs than most medium and large size 
businesses.8 This said one of the surprising findings of the survey is 
that with one exception (1 out of 15 respondents) none of the micro 
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size catering businesses proactively sought advice from EHOs. This is 
especially surprising as EHOs emerged as an important source of 
information for other food businesses. Two-thirds of the businesses 
we surveyed actively seek advice from the EHO. Inspection appears 
to be an important educative channel and it may be that micro 
businesses find these visits especially helpful – thus the perception 
that they have a good relationship – yet they may simultaneously 
lack the confidence to actively ask EHOs for advice in the way larger 
businesses do.   
 
We also questioned respondents about TSOs. They are clearly of 
influence (62%) on our food businesses but not as strong an 
influence as EHOs (91%). Knowledge about TSOs was patchier than 
was evident in the case of EHOs. For example when asked about 
TSOs 52% of micro and small businesses indicated a response of ‘Not 
applicable’ or ‘Don’t know’ compared to 10% who did not or could not 
respond on the subject of EHOs. Little patterning was evident 
according to the size of business or whether the business was a retail 
or catering business. TSOs received almost no spontaneous mention 
elsewhere in the survey where they were mentioned by less than 2% 
of respondents. This would suggest that an awareness exists of 
trading standards matters but managers, directors and owners have 
had little experience of direct contact with a TSO9.   
 
Food Standards Agency 
 
During the first phase of research the role of the FSA was, as one 
might expect from this group of experts, well known but there was a 
great deal of uncertainty about how well known the FSA would be 
within the food industry. Yet in our second phase survey the FSA was 
ranked as the third most important external influence on food retail 
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and catering businesses. This ranking did vary between businesses. 
Those with a detailed knowledge of the FSA tended to be at the 
highest levels within businesses, that is within ‘head office’ specialist 
functions and similarly specialist functions within trade associations.  
 
Confusion did exist about the division of responsibility and functions 
of state regulators. A sizeable minority of respondents did not realize 
that the EHO is an employee of the local council. Several specific 
references in the research were made to non-specific state bodies 
such as, ‘the government’ (7 references), ‘the authorities’ (2 
references) or ‘the council’ (6 references).  
 
Non-state regulators 
 
The growth of non-state actors in regulation and risk management 
practices was very well understood by our experts who in addition to 
state regulators and supranational institutions, identified a variety of 
non-state sources of regulation. In the economic category they cited 
trade organizations, commercial consultants, the insurance industry, 
lawyers, private standards and self-regulation/best practice. In the 
civil category they noted professional associations, scientists, 
advocacy and pressure groups, external accreditation agencies,  
assurance schemes, consumer NGOs, the public and the media.   
 
The second phase of data collection questioned respondents about a 
variety of sources of non-state influence.  As we can see from Table 
1 the most influential of these groups are consumers who, along with 
EHOs, exert the greatest influence over respondents’ food safety and 
food hygiene management.  
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Consumers 
 
Our first-phase interviews did not identify consumers as having such 
important potential in the regulatory system and did not indicate how 
widespread and strong an influence they would be amongst the 
business managers interviewed in the second phase of the research. 
For many businesses consumers were either as influential or almost 
as influential as EHOs.  
 
Most managers in the sample sense a general public awareness of 
food safety and food hygiene risks. This is well illustrated by Table 2 
below which shows how managers responded to a question about 
their understandings of consumer concerns. In two companies 100% 
of managers thought that consumers rated food safety and food 
hygiene issues as ‘Very important’.  Overall  ‘Price’ (value for money) 
was cited as the second highest concern of consumers. A senior risk 
manager from a large branded licensed catering chain commented 
that his business had ‘over complied on GM regulations due to 
consumer demand’. 
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
The media  
 
The media is often considered one of the most influential opinion 
formers but in this research their comparative strength of influence 
was not widely recognized.  During the period of study it was known 
that some businesses in the sample had first-hand experience of 
direct media attention. But specific details were difficult to obtain 
through the survey. Respondents were more prepared to discuss the 
more diffuse effects of the media where the influence is more 
generic: either the food industry or a food product becomes the 
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subject of media attention and all businesses are influenced.  A small 
group of individual managers across the sampled businesses 
criticized the media for creating ‘food scares’. Another group of 
mangers was clearly (possibly unwittingly) ‘part’ of the food scare in 
that they would cite risk matters, of often complex and disputed risk, 
which were receiving extensive press coverage at the time of study.10 
There was also concern that adverse publicity for any part of the 
industry had a contaminating effect on others: 
 
When bad practices are shown on TV I think people think that 
all catering businesses are run the same.  Not right!   
(Manager– contract catering business) 
 
Insurance companies 
 
Insurance companies are thought by some commentators to have a 
potentially important regulatory role (Ericson et al. 2003). Yet very 
few of those we interviewed and surveyed in our research regarded 
insurance companies as a significant influence on their management 
of food safety and food hygiene. 
 
Our experts thought it unlikely that insurance companies would 
figure prominently as an influence on food safety and hygiene 
standards but there was a suspicion amongst these experts that their 
influence may be increasing. A degree of scepticism about the ability 
of insurance companies to play a credible role in the food sector was 
also expressed, comments ranging from a view that insurance 
companies are not very good at quantifying risk, with others being 
especially concerned about moral hazard problems – ‘Insurance is 
the enemy of the good as it is designed to average out loss resulting 
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in the good not being rewarded and the bad not being punished’ 
(interview respondent).  
 
Some 60% of managers of micro/small businesses compared to 50% 
of medium and large companies11 claimed to have insurance cover 
for food hygiene and food safety incidents. Conversely, micro and 
small business managers (30%) view insurance companies as much 
less influential than did managers of medium and large businesses 
(50%). 20% of all managers received information on food hygiene 
and food safety from their insurance company but only one business 
(a micro/small business) reported ever having been inspected by an 
insurance company.  
 
Our survey found that 15% of managers in medium- and large-size 
businesses regarded insurance companies as having a ‘strong 
influence’ with the medium and large catering businesses being more 
inclined to regard them as strongly influential (20%) than the retail 
only businesses (8%).  
 
Lawyers 
 
The relevance of lawyers to risk management was not well 
understood by our survey respondents. Lawyers were considered to 
have the least influence of all the external actors we asked about in 
the survey. A slight difference in influence does emerge between the 
catering and retail sectors with the former responding that lawyers 
have greater influence than was the case with the retail sector. 
Interestingly almost 90% of managers of micro/small businesses did 
not answer this question. 
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Only two experts from phase 1 spontaneously referred to legal 
influence upon food safety. This was less a comment specifically 
regarding lawyers as individuals and more a comment on how the 
legal system in its broadest sense was perceived to operate. A 
director of a catering company commented that their risk 
management approach had a bias towards viewing risk from a legal 
perspective in an attempt to avoid litigation possibly relating to their 
business operations in the United States. A senior risk manager from 
the headquarters of a large licensed catering chain commented on 
the rise in claims from customers who had ‘fallen over in the car park 
after leaving our establishments’. He considered this an example 
‘compensation culture’. Surprisingly, given the debates about the UK 
being riddled with a ‘compensation culture’ his was the only explicit 
mention of this phenomenon in phase 1 and phase 2 of the research. 
Regardless of accuracy we expected these claims to be reflected in 
our findings but it was far from the case. 
 
Pressure groups/NGOs  
 
Pressure groups, especially NGOs, are perhaps one of the most well 
known regulatory sources in the civil sector. They are especially 
important for their information-gathering work and for their 
exploitation of publicity as a way of influencing business behaviour 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Hutter and O'Mahony 2004). Yet they 
did not figure prominently in our research. 
 
Phase 1 data revealed very different views of NGOs. A senior risk 
manager from a licensed catering chain commented that the Better 
Regulation Task Force and Food Standards Agency ‘even out the 
influence of the National Consumer Council (NCC) and other (pro-
consumer) lobbyists’. A contrasting comment came from a director of 
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a large food retailer who mentioned that as part of developing their 
Corporate Social Responsibility scheme they were working with a 
team of academics and consumer-friendly NGOs.  
  
One director in phase 2 suggested that his employees would not 
know what a pressure group or NGO was and this is to some extent 
borne out by our data. Overall 40% of our sample was unable to 
answer questions about NGOs with 86% of respondents in one large 
UK restaurant chain and 83% from a large UK takeaway chain being 
unable to answer at all. Generally, 31% of respondents attributed 
NGOs ‘no influence’ with just 5% indicating a strong influence. 
 
Private consultancy firms  
 
Management and other more specialist consultancies focusing on 
selling risk management and regulatory compliance advice, cover a 
range of risk management domains. Many such organizations exist, 
their trade being to sell advice which will assist businesses 
understand state regulations and guidance, ensure that they have 
compliance systems in place and even offer advice on how 
businesses should relate to regulators especially in registering their 
businesses with regulators, licensing processes, complaints 
procedures or legal actions.   
 
In our research views about consultancy firms were mixed. Two large 
private consultancies specialising in the food industry were widely 
known and highly regarded for their provision of a range of technical, 
business, scientific, regulatory and legal services relating to risk. 
These were mentioned by senior policy makers and directors in 
phases 1 and 2 as providing research, policy and operations support 
to many businesses in the sector. However, knowledge of these two 
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consultancies was dependent upon level of seniority in the staff 
hierarchy, not a single manager mentioned consultancy, only those 
at directorial level.   
 
Other consultancies mentioned by respondents were typically small 
consultancies run by former state regulators or former technical 
employees of large food companies. These were used for advice and 
inspection. The most direct evidence of influence came from a 
catering chain where the scores from consultancy audits influenced 
the calculation of the remuneration of the board of directors. Not a 
single micro or small business in either the retail or catering sectors 
represented in the sample used a consultancy as their main source of 
information about food safety and hygiene risks.  
 
Not all consultancies were viewed positively and some received a 
great deal of criticism from all of the sectors represented. They were 
seen to be exploiting the confusion of micro firms and SMEs relating 
to HACCP12 – ‘consultants are making a killing out of HACCP, just 
pulling stuff off the net and then selling it’ (interview respondent). 
But there was more than moral indignation, some expressed concern 
that there is ‘over-implementation of risk management practices due 
to the advice of commercial consultants’. This very much chimes with 
evidence that consultancy firms may be a source of what has come 
to be referred to as regulatory creep (BRTF 2004). 
 
Trade associations 
 
Trade associations are a prominent form of economic self-regulation 
where businesses voluntarily join schemes involved in establishing 
and maintaining codes of practice (Gunningham 1995; Rees 1997). 
They may thus play an important risk management role for their 
17 
members. For example, they may have an educative, training role 
and liaise with government over the best ways to achieve the 
required standards.  They may issue their own codes to this end such 
as the British Hospitality Association Fitness for Purpose voluntary 
code relating to accommodation and catering standards in the 
hospitality sector. Trade associations may play a direct regulatory 
role where they run their own self-policing schemes. Such food 
assurance schemes include standard setting and inspection and in 
some cases may embrace food safety and food hygiene matters. But 
many food businesses may not belong to an association. This is 
particularly acute in the catering sector where one of our participants 
estimated that perhaps only one-third of all businesses belong to an 
association, compared to retail businesses where over 90% are 
thought to belong to a trade association.  
 
In our survey only senior staff – at director level or above – working 
for large organizations were aware of their firm’s membership in 
trade associations such as the British Retail Consortium, Institute of 
Grocery Distribution, the Food and Drink Federation and Association 
of Convenience Stores. No branch manager in any of the businesses 
surveyed was aware of their firm’s membership of trade associations. 
Some directors thought they were members of trade associations but 
were unsure of which ones. A senior risk manager from a large group 
of licensed catering chains commented that the majority (75%) of 
their food suppliers meet a type of ‘private’ standard developed by a 
trade association, the British Retail Consortium Higher standard.13 
Amongst the larger food retailers and catering businesses this 
standard is thought to be widely used and valued.  Of the micro, 
small- or medium-sized businesses only one indicated membership of 
two trade associations.  
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5% of managers for medium and large businesses indicated that a 
trade association made checks on food safety and food hygiene on 
their premises. A similar figure indicated that a trade association 
provided information on food safety and food hygiene to them and 
2% indicated this information was provided to their staff. None of 
these managers named or described these trade associations. It is 
thought that confusion exists with categories of organization – some 
managers may believe that a commercial consultancy is a trade 
organization. Similarly, some managers who mentioned using the 
services of a commercial consultancy may in fact be the clients of the 
commercial arm of a trade association. The line between the two is 
often unclear. 
 
When considering food safety and food hygiene risks directors of 
large retail businesses were moderately more influenced by an 
‘industry association’ than the directors of large catering business 
although in both sectors the influence is not ‘strong’. 
 
Some participants were very supportive of self-regulatory schemes 
such as the Red Tractor launched in the UK in June 2000 by Assured 
Food Standards which was created by the National Farmers Union 
(NFU) with government backing (Meat and Livestock Commission). 
Other participants preferred greater clarity about whether or not 
there is a regulatory requirement upon them or not i.e. a legal 
requirement to comply. There was a view that if schemes such as 
these are to have any chance of success then strong enforcement is 
necessary. 
 
Several references were made by managers to what we believe are 
in-house schemes or proprietary standards which do not appear to 
have been created by trade associations or state regulators. Such 
schemes and standards have either been developed internally within 
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businesses or have been introduced with the assistance of paid 
external technical or business consultants. These schemes and 
standards were referred to in passing by several of the managers 
using an acronym: all of whom worked for the large businesses in the 
sample. Adherence to these schemes and standards appeared to be 
mandatory for those working within the business.  Large 
supermarkets and caterers are another potential source of regulation, 
not just with respect to their own branches but also with respect to 
the supply chain. There was a very definitive view amongst some of 
our respondents that in the case of large national companies and 
franchises, corporate risk management systems for food safety and 
food hygiene take precedence over all others, the state included.14 
Discussion 
Two strong messages can be drawn from the research: first that 
state regulation remains a key influence on business risk 
management practices; second that respondents readily understood 
that there are other non-state external influences on their risk 
management practices. 
 
Managers’ knowledge of EHOs, the local authority regulators, was 
most widespread and most sophisticated. This is not entirely 
surprising as they are in most contact with the industry at floor level 
and their remit directly relates to the food safety and food hygiene 
risks we asked about. TSOs do not work directly to this remit but the 
survey responses do not seem to have such a nuanced reason for 
their ignorance – the indications are that they have less knowledge of 
trading standards. Knowledge of the nationally-based FSA is high at 
senior management and policy levels of large businesses but less so 
at junior management level. Overall, however, knowledge of the FSA 
amongst businesses was much higher than our expert group 
anticipated it would be. 
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The influence of non-state bodies was best understood by our senior 
experts and policy makers who spontaneously referred to a wide 
range of such influences. Our survey revealed knowledge of these 
influences and also presented us with some surprising results. For 
example, the role of consumers as an important influence on 
business risk management practices was not flagged up by our 
experts yet in our survey consumers were cited as one of the 
strongest influences on risk management. Indeed, not only did 
consumers figure highly as an influence they were also deemed to 
rank food safety and food hygiene as the most important consumer 
concern. 
 
Turning to influences beyond the state, the influence of the media 
was deemed to be well below the influence of consumers and state 
officials.  The other main sources of civil power, NGOs, surprisingly, 
were not well understood as an influence despite their role in 
opposing GM foods and promoting organic produce. Campaigns on 
these issues were running at the time of the research so we had 
expected a greater knowledge of NGOs and their regulatory role. 
Another surprise is the fairly low influence attributed to lawyers. 
Given the prominent debate about the compensation culture we were 
surprised that respondents rarely mentioned the possibility of 
compensation claims or civil actions.  Likewise insurance companies 
also appeared to have a much less influential role than attributed by 
some commentators.  
 
Consultancy firms appeared to have influence and, in fact, the 
potential for substantial influence in some areas of the industry. The 
nature of this influence is controversial and an important topic in its 
own right. Trade associations are also potentially important especially 
as an area of industry self-regulation, but their influence is obviously 
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confined to their membership and the food industry is one where 
there are significant numbers of businesses which do not fall within 
the remit of these associations. 
 
So consumers and EHOs were deemed to exercise a direct influence 
over food safety and food hygiene risk management practices; 
private consultancy firms and trade associations sometimes had a 
direct influence, depending on the size of the business; the media 
and NGOs were more indirect background influences; and lawyers 
and insurance companies played a negligible role, with the latter 
even being described as a negative influence. Let’s consider now how 
these findings compare with other studies. 
 
The general levels of knowledge about the overall state regulatory 
system echoes the findings of other studies, although knoweldge of 
EHOs appear to be higher than those found by studies of other 
regulators. Genn (1993) found great variation in levels of regulatory 
knowledge, with confusion about regulators highest on the smaller 
sites she visited. She also found little evidence of the regulated in 
smaller businesses being prepared to debate with inspectors, rather 
like the micro and small businesses in this study. In larger companies 
there is a greater readiness to use regulators as a resource. In 
Hutter’s (2001) study of a national railway company the social 
dimensions of regulatory knowledge and understanding were striking 
with senior personnel having a much greater understanding of the 
regulatory system than those lower down the hierarchy. This of 
course very much accords with our findings. 
 
The literature on the impact of state regulators reveals a variable 
impact.  The overwhelming majority of railway employees 
interviewed in Hutter’s 2001 study thought that the state regulator 
was very important in bringing about higher standards of health and 
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safety in the industry.  Likewise Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 
(2003) conclude that regulation is key in shaping corporate 
behaviour. This contrasts with earlier studies by Gricar (1983) and 
Clay (1984) on OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration) inspectors in the United States. Most studies argue 
for the necessity of maintaining some kind of outside policing of 
business risk management primarily to ensure that risk management 
objectives are established and maintained on a firm’s agenda and to 
establish  ‘credible enforcement’ (Gray and Scholz 1991; 
Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Hutter 2001). 
 
The influence of non-state actors on business risk management is not 
well researched and much of the work that does exist is speculative.   
There is some work in the environmental field about the potential 
importance of consumer preferences in influencing corporate 
environmental policies. Grabosky (1994), for example, argues that 
preferential buying or consumer boycotts may have the capacity to 
influence business environmental behaviour more than state 
regulation. But there is no corresponding research in the area of food 
safety and food hygiene. A study in the UK found consumers regard 
food safety as highly important but that they have few concerns 
about it as they generally agree that standards in the UK are very 
high (IGD 1998). 
 
There is work on the increasing importance of trade and industry 
organizations and the international standards organizations (Cashore, 
et al. 2004; Eisner 2004; Ronit and Schneider 1999). Private 
standards such as those promulgated by trade associations are 
increasingly important in the global food system. Fulponi (2006) 
argues that such standards have become an important governance 
tool for major retailers and also that they are increasingly more 
stringent than those of government.  Their importance in the food 
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chain is regarded as especially important (Henson and Hooker 2001). 
Likewise Holleran et al. (1999) see the potential incentives for food 
businesses to adopt these standards. These include satisfying 
customer requirements and helping to meet legislative demands.  
Trade associations may play an important role in making and 
communicating standards. Research in the environmental field 
suggests that they have a significant regulatory influence over 
environmental performance, particularly in a co-ordinating capacity 
(Bailey and Rupp 2004). 
 
The role of broader social concerns in influencing business has been 
discussed.  The notion of the ‘social licence to operate’ (Gunningham, 
Kagan and Thornton 2003) is possibly most forceful here. An 
important component in ‘the social licence to operate’ is the role of 
civil society and non-governmental organizations (Gunningham, 
Kagan and Thornton. 2003). These groups undertake an important 
monitoring role and their views, alongside those of the local 
community, are an important influence on business practices. 
Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2003: 153-4) also found less 
evidence than anticipated regarding the influence of NGO activity 
over pulp manufacturers, although they did accord local community 
activists an important role in influencing corporate behaviour.  
 
NGOs often gain their influence through their use of the media and 
here they are deemed to have had some success, a prominent 
example being the Nestlé baby milk case when negative media 
campaigning led to consumer boycotts of its products (Hutter and 
O'Mahony 2004). Generally, the role of the media as a regulatory 
force is deliberated as a theoretical possibility rather than empirical 
actuality. Fisse and Braithwaite (1983) discussed how corporate 
deviance might be controlled by the use of adverse publicity since it 
targeted the desire of businesses to protect their reputations. Mason 
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and Mason (1992) also examined the mass media as a means of 
enhancing taxpayer compliance, arguing that this may be a means of 
persuasion for moral compliance and the promotion of civic virtue. 
The media plays an important informational role which can influence 
demand for products such as food (Baron 2005; Swinnen et al. 
2005).  Some regard this as a positive influence. Lang and Hallman 
(2005) for example, refer to the media as ‘a watchdog of the public 
interest’. Others regard the media as a source of social amplification 
(Kunreuther 2002; Pidgeon et al. 2003) although there is 
disagreement about how serious this is. Frewer et al (2002) argue 
that the effects of such amplification of food incidents may be short-
lived and may move according to changing levels of media reporting. 
Wakefield and Elliott (2003) found that newspapers though a major 
source of environmental information were also inconsistent and 
unreliable and thus were not trusted by the public, especially by 
those with access to other information networks. 
 
Three of the economic non-state influences we have discussed have 
attracted little research interest, most especially empirical interest. 
There is very little research on the role of lawyers in business risk 
management decisions. There appears to be no compelling evidence 
that liability laws do have influence on food businesses. While some 
authors (Holleran et al. 1999) contend that these laws are a potential 
incentive to food safety others disagree. Buzby and Frenzen (1999), 
for example, referring to the United States where civil litigation is 
relatively well used, argue that product liability systems for food are 
weak and thus offer weak incentives with respect to promoting food 
safety.  Henson and Caswell (1999) feel that the main influence in 
the UK is indirect, namely that the ‘due diligence’ concept in UK 
product liability law is a strong incentive for the use of third party 
certification and the adoption of private standards. They also argue 
that ‘ex post liability’ is of secondary importance in the UK. 
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Insurance cover for the food industry is active in two main areas: 
general liability and product recall. The former is the most common 
and given the low level of litigation incurs relatively little cost. The 
latter is a relatively new form of insurance for an event which has the 
potential to be very costly in both monetary and reputational terms. 
It is for this reason that Skees et al. (2001: 100) believe that 
insurance has great potential as an alternative to regulation. But the 
conclusion of their article is that this has not yet been realized. There 
is some evidence in the environmental sector that financial 
institutions such as insurance companies take account of 
environmental performance in making decisions about business 
(Grabosky 1994; Eisner 2004) but again opinions differ. 
Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2003), for instance, found that 
financial institutions were a weak influence in the environmental area 
they researched, namely pulp manufacturing. 
 
Variability 
 
An important objective of the research was to map out variability 
between businesses. Our findings do reflect the literature where the 
size of a business is main criterion explaining variability; this is 
identified, for example, as a key indicator of regulatory capacity. Our 
discussions with experts in the food sector revealed that many of 
them believed risk to be strongly related to size, with effort 
proportionate to the size of the business. Some reflected upon the 
ability of small businesses to manage risks – ‘Smaller businesses 
expect inspectors to manage risks for them’. This said there was 
vocal minority who argued that such statements should not be too 
sweeping and examples of large companies suffering serious and 
high profile risk management problems were cited. 
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Like other studies our SMEs generally had lower levels of knowledge 
of regulatory laws and state regulatory systems (BRTF 1999; 
Fairman & Yapp, 2004; FSA 2001; Gunningham, 2002; Henson and 
Heasman 1998; Vickers et al. 2005). They also appeared to rely on 
state regulatory systems for education and advice. One reason for 
SME reliance on state systems is that many small businesses have 
less contact with non-state sources which provide information and 
advice. They are not members of trade or business associations 
which may provide updates or even training on food safety and food 
hygiene matters nor do they use consultancies (Fairman and Yapp 
2004; Genn 1993).  This of course contrasts with large businesses 
which have greater regulatory capacity of their own and more likely 
to belong to associations, employ consultancies and take out 
insurance cover. Indeed in the case of large retailers and caterers 
they may even become a source of regulation for other parts of the 
food chain as they impose standards which are sometimes in excess 
of state regulatory requirements. 
 
A second factor which may be relevant in any variability between 
businesses is business type. The food industry comprises two main 
areas, namely, hospitality (catering) and retail. It is estimated that 
there are approximately 102,537 grocery retail outlets providing 
1,184,000 jobs in the UK (DEFRA 2005) and 262,948 caterers 
(hotels, cafés and restaurants) providing 1,394,000 jobs (DEFRA 
2005; BRTF 2000). The large majority are small businesses (Fairman 
and Yapp, 2004). 
 
Many of those we spoke to in the research drew a clear distinction 
between the retailing and hospitality sectors. Retailing was seen to 
be concerned with distributing rather than manufacturing products. 
The hospitality sector was identified as ‘the biggest challenge’ partly 
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because of the high turnover of staff, the handling of cooked and 
uncooked food together and changing menus being a source of new 
risks. A further risk factor associated with the hospitality sector is 
that: 
Catering is demand-led whereas food manufacturing is planned 
over a long period therefore HACCP sometimes goes out of the 
window as customers need to be served. Time pressures lead 
to corners being cut.  
Another participant commented that ‘the hospitality sector is a very 
fragmented sector, they don’t tend to gel as a sector’.   
 
This accords with an IGD (1998) finding that food consumers are 
most likely to question restaurant rather than retail hygiene 
standards and MORI data that the British are especially anxious 
about the risk of contracting food poisoning in restaurants. The 
extent to which retailers were regarded as risky partly depended 
upon the type of food they sold, for example, whether it is fresh or 
pre-packaged. Also deemed relevant was whether or not they were 
small independent retailers or part of a broader company or 
franchise. 
 
Conclusion 
  
These research data indicate that the move from government to 
governance is understood by those in business to the extent that 
they are well aware that there are multiple external influences on 
their internal risk management practices.  These influences organize 
to shape the motives and preferences of business and thus affect 
their internal workings. The exception would be one of the most 
potent of the influences discerned in this research namely 
consumers. There are examples of consumers organizing, for 
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example, in campaigns for organic or fair trade produce, against GM 
foods or against particular firms but generally food safety and food 
hygiene are not the subject of such campaigns.  Our sample was 
referring to the crucial importance of maintaining business 
reputations and their belief that maintaining high food safety and 
food hygiene standards is crucial to this. Whether or not this is an 
accurate perception is irrelevant. The important fact here is that this 
is what our managers believed and acted upon. Food retailing and 
hospitality are fiercely competitive sectors: consumers have a good 
choice of retail and hospitality outlets and can easily switch their 
preferences.  Product differentiation is key to the industry and 
millions of pounds are spent on this each year.   
 
Strictly speaking consumers exercising their preferences en masse 
and without organization, would fall outside of most definitions of 
regulation, although the finding does indicate the power that 
organized consumer action could have.  What this influence does add 
weight to the contention that social, economic and state influences all 
serve to influence the internal workings of business. It also suggests 
that there are domain effects to be considered. Gunningham, Kagan 
and Thornton (2003: 137ff) accord environmental controls a key role 
in increasing performance world-wide and in the case of the paper 
and pulp industry argues that this has led to convergence across 
different jurisdictions.  Our research focused on the UK only so 
cannot comment on the contention of international convergence.  But 
we can say that there is not evidence of convergence within the UK.  
Variations did appear according to the size of the business, its type 
and where it was located. These differences may suggest that the 
domain effect is significant and worth exploring. This suggestion is 
strengthened by the contrasting findings for the importance of NGOs 
and activists, who were found to be more influential by Gunningham, 
Kagan and Thornton than in this research on food.  
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Clearly the interaction between the state, economy and civil society 
is complex and may be greater than the effect of the sum parts. 
These influences do also seem to work differentially according to the 
social structure of the business. In the case we have discussed there 
are few formal ‘joined up’ connections between the state and non- 
state systems.  There are, however, some ways in which regulatory 
actors do acknowledge and indirectly co-opt other regulatory players.  
Notable here are EHOs, some of whom ‘name and shame’ those with 
poor food safety and food hygiene practices; publicly rate or 
certificate premises with high standards; or certificate individuals 
who have been trained in food safety and food hygiene.  Such 
information plays to other potential regulatory forces and directly to 
consumers.  The complexities and dynamics involved are well 
illustrated by this case.  The state, represented by EHOs, produces 
information which may be deployed by the media, consumers and 
other groups; thus they potentially influence the social reputational 
standing of a business; and thus influence its commercial/economic 
position.  
 
We should not automatically assume that all external forces have a 
positive influence on risk management practices. Certainly, 
consultancies have been implicated in regulatory creep. Likewise the 
influence of insurance companies can be problematic and deserves 
greater scrutiny.  The background influences are variable according 
to topicality and size of business. The ways in which factors play out 
and interact are not well understood.  The academic literature does 
suggest that each of the background influences has the potential to 
be a direct influence but as yet we need a great deal more evidence 
of this and how it might be realized and the conditions under which 
each influence is likely to be helpful.  
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We do know that businesses are subject to a complexity of pressures 
on their risk management practices. Some are external to their 
organization and others are within their organizational boundaries. 
Indeed different pressures may be in tension. The nature of these 
interactions is not well understood and the next step is to explore 
this further. This paper draws on research undertaken with the food 
industry. Our next step is to compare this with another risk 
regulation domain to better understand how the various external 
influences on business risk management might work across different 
areas. 
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Table 1: The range of influences upon managers when 
considering food safety and food hygiene risks based on the 
statistical mean of all questionnaires (completed) by managers. 
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Source of 
influence – 
ranked by level of 
influence 
 
Influence 
 
Influence index 
(Mean values of 
questionnaires) 
 
 
EHO 
 
 
Most influence 
1.35 
 
Consumers 
 
 
1.36 
 
FSA 
 
1.74 
 
TSO 
 
1.90 
 
Media 
 
2.46 
 
Insurance 
 
2.85 
 
Lawyers 
 
3.19 
 
Pressure group/NGO 
 
Least influence 3.23 
 
Table 2: The range of perception importance to consumers by 
managers when considering a range of food attributes commonly 
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related to risk based on the statistical mean of all questionnaires 
(completed) by managers. 
 
Consumer concerns 
 
Managers 
understandings of 
relative 
importance of 
consumer 
concerns 
 
 
Importance 
index 
(Mean values 
of 
questionnaires) 
 
Food safety and 
hygiene 
 
 
Most important 
1.1 
 
Price (value for money) 
 
 
1.65 
 
Labelling & product 
description 
 
2.2 
 
BSE 
 
2.35 
 
Food additives 
 
2.4 
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GM (Genetic 
Modification) / Use of 
pesticides to grow food 
 
2.55 / 2.55 
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2 Regulation has a multiplicity of meanings (see Black 2002). In this 
paper we see regulation as a means of managing risks so we focus 
on organizational responses to the risks generated by business 
activities and we consider responses originating within and beyond 
the state. 
 
3 Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2003) use the concepts of 
governmental, social and economic ‘licences to operate’ as ways of 
understanding variations in environmental performance amongst 
businesses. See also Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Hutter 2001; 
Parker 2002. 
 
4 This included meetings with 8 central government policy-makers; 
25 regulators from central and local government; 8 Trade 
associations representatives; 11  retail and producer business 
leaders; and 4 representatives from consumer groups.   
 
5 Company size definitions: Large firm: over 250 employees; medium 
firm: 50 - 249 employees; small firm: 10 - 49 employees; micro-firm 
(including sole trader):  0 - 9 employees. Source: European 
Commission (1996) and DTI (2006). The food retail/grocery sector 
was segmented into supermarket, convenience store and specialist 
retailer. The catering/hospitality sector was segmented into 
restaurant, take-away and contract catering. 
 
6 7 large companies and 22 SMEs participated in the research.  1 
person per SME was interviewed and on average 7 per large 
company. 
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7 The research did not take for granted that state legislation is 
familiar to everyone working in this industry. Rather it problematized 
this issue aiming to discover the extent of knowledge about different 
regulatory systems (state and non-state). 
 
8 Not a single business in the entire sample claimed to have a bad 
relationship with an EHO.  
 
9Business managers working in Greater London would not have 
contact with a dedicated TSO; here the tasks of EHO and TSO are 
combined.  
 
10  Chief among these were GMO in the food chain, BSE, epidemics 
and ‘chemicals’. In the latter stages of data collection this referred to 
banned contamination by dyes from the Sudan family of red/brown 
food colorants which were found in several manufacturers of branded 
and supermarket private label products. 
http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/sudani/sudanitimeline FSA 2005  
 
11  Some 33% of directors/senior managers responded with ‘don’t 
know’. 
 
12 HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point) is an internationally 
recognized and recommended system of food safety management 
focusing on identifying the ‘critical points’ in food safety problems (or 
‘hazards’) and taking pre-emptive measures. 
http://www.food.gov.uk/foodindustry/hygiene/ 
 
13 This is one of a series of standards now referred to as the ‘BRC 
Global Standard – Food’. This publication has now become an 
international mark of excellence. Certification to the Standard verifies 
technical competence and aids manufacturers, brand owners and 
retailers fulfilment of legal obligations. It also safeguards the 
consumer.’ http://www.brc.org.uk/standards/about_food.htm 2006 
 
14 The impact of these standards on other parts of the food supply 
chain was not within the remit of this study but it should be noted 
that the regulatory powers of supermarkets over producers is a point 
of some controversy in Britain. 
